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The flows of migration from neighbouring countries into the European Union have, since its
inception, been more relevant than those of internal migration. Thus, labour movements from
relatively less industrialized countries of the EU —such as Italy in the 50’s— towards the
relatively more advanced ones —such as France and Germany— quickly vanished after the
European Community was established among the initial six members. Later, migration from
Portugal and Spain towards the richer EU countries was again greatly reduced, when those
countries, as Italy and Greece before them, also became members of the Community. Migration
flows from Turkey, on the other hand, were slowed down only by specific restrictions,
particularly in Germany, and will probably be no longer relevant once the customs union
between the EU and Turkey is completed. In the meantime, migrants from Southern
Mediterranean, Eastern European, and other extra-EU countries keep pressing at the EU borders.
The recent flow of illegal immigrants from Albania, particularly into Italy and Greece, is only the
latest and more dramatised example of a larger and continuing phenomenon.
Thus the issue of labour migration, as well as its legal or illegal aspects, is strictly
intertwined —both theoretically and empirically— with the issue of economic integration,
particularly when this takes place among countries that are relatively more advanced than their
neighbours.
In this paper, as an attempt at exploring some theoretical basis of these phenomena, we
consider a country into which immigration takes place exogenously. footnote  The model used to
describe its economy is based on overlapping generations. People go through two periods in their
life. During the first period they work, consume and save, in order to afford consumption also in
the second period, when they will no longer work.
The government taxes labour income in order to finance public expenditure, which takes the
form of transfers to retired workers. footnote  Thus government expenditures may be interpreted
as a pension scheme based on the ”pay as you go” system. Workers are both natives of the
country, and immigrants. Without attaching any particular value judgment to it, we make the
assumption that the government of the host country, in optimising its behaviour, takes into
account only the utility of indigenous residents. footnote 
We assume that the exogenous rate of immigration is higher than the rate of growth of native
population. Also, we assume that, relative to a previous situation when the pension scheme was
put in place, the rate of growth of indigenous population has fallen below the rate of interest.
Thus promises of a ”pay as you go” pension scheme can no longer be kept, and a new scheme
based on capitalisation becomes superior. In such a situation, immigration is beneficial, in the
sense that the government is able to keep the promises based on the ”pay as you go” pension
scheme, by drawing on the higher demographic fertility of the immigrant population.
Immigrants come and work in the host country either legally or illegally. Besides exploring
the viability of the old pension scheme through immigration, we are interested in endogenising
the share of total immigrants that come in legally, and in explaining the decision by legal
immigrants to retire in the host country, or to return to their country of origin after their working
period. We analyse two fiscal means through which the government of the host country can
influence these decisions. They are the rate of labour income taxation, and the share of pension
that the government will transfer to legal immigrants, in case they decide to return home, rather
than remain in the host country, after retirement.
In Section 2 we present the structure of the basic model. Section 3 examines how the
government can maximise the welfare of its natives by using fiscal instruments, that are related
to the income of immigrants during both the working and the retirement periods of their life.
Section 4 presents the conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis, and indicates directions
for further research.The model
In order to make welfare comparisons of alternative situations we take the point of view of
the country into which immigration flows, i.e. the host country.
The following function specifies the utility of consumers, footnote  as they work in period t
and retire in period t + 1:
Ut = ct,t
J ct,t+1
1?J   #   
The economy produces only one good, according to the following production function:
Yt = Kt
KLt
1?K   #   
Resident population footnote  at time t (i.e. Rt) is made up of native workers (Nt,t), native
retired people (Nt?1,t), newly immigrated workers (Mt,t), and retired guest workers (Mt?1,t):
Rt = ￿Nt,t + Mt,t￿ + ￿Nt?1,t + Mt?1,t￿ = Lt,t + Nt?1,t + Mt?1,t   #   
where Lt,t ﬂ Nt,t + Mt,t is total labour force at time t. We assume that native people do not
migrate, so that:
Nt,t = Nt?1,t￿1 + n￿   #   
where n is the given constant rate of growth of native population. Total immigrants (Mt,t) may
reside and work legally (M # t,t) or illegally (M * t,t) in the host country:
Mt,t ﬂ M # t,t + M * t,t   #   
For simplicity we assume that both flows of immigration —legal and illegal— grow at the same
rate m, so that:
Mt,t = Mt?1,t?1￿1 + m￿   #   
and that:
Mt?1,t = M # t?1,t = NM # t?1,t?1   #   
where N is the share of young legal immigrants that decide to remain in the host country after
retirement. Note that in ( ref: delta ) we have implicitely assumed that all illegal immigrants must
return to their country of origin after retirement.
The rate of immigration m is exogenous. The government of the host country provides public
expenditure in the form of transfers paid to retired people, financed by taxation of labour
incomes. Thus the government budget constraint is:
￿Nt?1,t + NM # t?1,t?1￿gt + ￿1 ? N￿M # t?1,t?1Sgt = bgtL # t   #   
where
L # t = Nt,t + M # t,t = Lt,t ? M * t,t
is the legal labour force, and where gt is the basic per capita government transfer in real terms, b
is the rate of labour income taxation, and gt is the real wage. Note that in ( ref: gbudget1 ) we
have assumed that labour taxes are levied only on legal labour income, and that the same applies
to government transfers. We have also assumed that legal immigrants returning to their country
of origin after retirement receive only a part (0 † S † 1) of the basic transfer paid to all other
(both native and immigrated) retired residents. Collecting terms in ( ref: gbudget1 ) we get:ÆNt?1,t + ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿M # t?1,t?1￿gt = bgtL # t   #   
Consumers face different budget constraints, according to their status:
a) if they are natives, or legal immigrants that decide to retire in the host country:
ptct,t + pt+1ct,t+1 = ￿1 ? b￿gtpt + pt+1gt+1   #   
b) if they are legal immigrants that decide to retire in their original country:
ptc #t,t + pt+1c #t,t+1 = ￿1 ? b￿gtpt + pt+1Sgt+1   #   
c) if they are illegal immigrants:
ptc *t,t + pt+1c *t,t+1 = ￿1 ? e￿gtpt   #   
where e is the rate of ”taxation” that criminal organisations collect on illegal labour income to
help them enter and work in the country illegally. As a first step, we assume that e = b. footnote 
We shall also assume that this tax is paid to foreign criminal organizations, whose members do
not consume or save anything in the form of the host country product. Thus the tax revenue to
criminal organisations is a complete loss of national product. footnote 
Total residents’ consumption at time t is
Ct = ct,t￿Nt,t + NM # t,t￿ + c #t,t￿1 ? N￿M # t,t + c *t,tM * t,t +
+ ct?1,t￿Nt?1,t + NM # t?1,t?1￿   #   
where the first three terms on the right hand side correspond to consumption by working
residents (natives, legal and illegal immigrants), while the last term correspond to consumption
by retired (native and immigrated) residents. Notice that this implies that international trade is
only of an inter-temporal nature, i.e. it is assumed to be made up only of a flow of exports of the
host country product, which is transferred by the government to those immigrants that decide to
return in their country of origin after retirement. footnote  Thus a structural trade surplus must be
balanced by a structural international transfer of income.




gt = ￿1 ? K￿kt
K   #   
where rt+1 is the rate of return to capital, equal to the interest rate, from period t to period t + 1,
and
kt ﬂ Kt/Lt ﬂ Kt/￿Nt,t + M # t,t + M * t,t￿   #   
Optimisation by consumers —natives, legal and illegal immigrants— determines per capita
consumption in the two periods:
ct,t = J ￿1 ? b￿gt +
pt+1
pt gt+1
c #t,t = J ￿1 ? b￿gt +
pt+1
pt Sgt+1
c *t,t = J￿1 ? b￿gt
  #   ct,t+1 = ￿1 + rt+1￿￿1 ? J￿ ￿1 ? b￿gt +
pt+1
pt gt+1
c #t,t+1 = ￿1 + rt+1￿￿1 ? J￿ ￿1 ? b￿gt +
pt+1
pt Sgt+1
c *t,t+1 = ￿1 + rt+1￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gt
  #   
Total capital accumulation results from domestic saving. We assume that the country builds its
own capital stock by costless moulding of the consumption good into physical capital, and that it
does so only on the basis of its own saving (by nationals, legal and illegal immigrants), without
borrowing from abroad. Thus
Kt+1 = ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gt ? J pt+1
pt gt+1 ￿Nt,t + NM # t,t￿ +
+ ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gt ? J pt+1
pt Sgt+1 ￿1 ? N￿M # t,t +
+ ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gtM * t,t   #   
Note that, in deriving ( ref: indcons2 ), we have used the intertemporal equilibrium condition
1 + rt+1 = pt
pt+1   #   
In ( ref: capital ) we have also assumed that capital is wholly consumed by retired workers, who
leave no bequests to the young generation. footnote 
In order to compare different situations, we refer only to the utility derived from
consumption by native residents. In other words, we assume that the welfare of immigrants is of
relatively minor concern to the government of the host country. footnote  Focusing on the utility
function of native residents, we can see that, for given b and g, it depends univocally on gt, and
therefore on the capital/labour ratio kt. Thus we need to make explicit the determinants of
per-worker stock of capital. From ( ref: capital ) this is equal to:
kt+1 =
￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gt ? J
pt+1
pt gt+1 ￿Nt,t + NM # t,t￿
Nt+1,t+1 + M # t+1,t+1 + M * t+1,t+1
+
+
￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gt ? J
pt+1
pt Sgt+1 ￿1 ? N￿M # t,t
Nt+1,t+1 + M # t+1,t+1 + M * t+1,t+1
+
+ ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿gtM * t,t
Nt+1,t+1 + M # t+1,t+1 + M * t+1,t+1
  #   
Note that, from the government budget constraint ( ref: gbudget1 ), we have:
gt = bgtL # t
Nt?1,t + ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿M # t?1,t?1
  #   
Leading forward ( ref: gt ) by one period, substituting the expression for gt+1, and dividing
numerator and demominator by Nt,t we get: footnote 
gt+1 =
b￿1 ? K￿kt+1
K ￿1 + n￿ +
M # 0
N0 ￿1 + m￿￿ 1+m
1+n ￿t




Assuming m > n and taking the limit for t ‚ K, we get the steady state value:gM
D = b￿1 ? K￿￿kM
D ￿
K￿1 + m￿
N + S￿1 ? N￿
  #   
where the D and the index M denote the value of a variable in steady states with migration.
Similarly, dividing by Nt,t both numerator and denominator in ( ref: smallk ), we get:
kt+1 =
￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿￿1 ? K￿kt
K ? J
pt+1
pt gt+1 ￿1 + NQ # t￿
1 + n + ￿1 + m￿Q # t + ￿1 + m￿Q * t
+
+
￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿￿1 ? K￿kt
K ? J
pt+1
pt Sgt+1 ￿1 ? N￿Q # t
1 + n + ￿1 + m￿Q # t + ￿1 + m￿Q * t
+
+ ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿￿1 ? K￿kt
KQ * t
1 + n + ￿1 + m￿Q # t + ￿1 + m￿Q * t
  #   
where
Q # t ﬂ M # 0
N0
￿ 1 + m
1 + n ￿t; and Q * t ﬂ M * 0
N0
￿ 1 + m
1 + n ￿t
For t ‚ K ( ref: smallk2 ) becomes:
kM
D = ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿￿1 ? K￿￿kM
D ￿K
1 + m ?
JgM
D M # 0
pt+1
pt ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿
￿1 + m￿￿M # 0 + M * 0￿
and defining
W # ﬂ M # 0
M # 0 + M * 0
; and W * ﬂ M * 0
M # 0 + M * 0




￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿￿1 ? K￿￿kM
D ￿K ? JW #gM
D pt+1
pt ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿
1 + m
Substituting for gM
D from ( ref: gm1 ) we get
kM
D = ￿1 ? K￿￿kM
D ￿K ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? b￿ ? JbW #￿1 + m￿
pt+1
pt
1 + m   #   
We assume that the rate of growth of native population, n, is lower than r. Thus a ”pay as you
go” pension scheme —possibly based on a higher native rate of growth that has steadily
decreased— is no longer viable and has become inferior to one based on capitalisation, if the
country is demographically isolated from the rest of the world. However, as demographic growth
in other countries, and immigration from them, are assumed to be higher, the government should
control the financing of its pension transfers so as to make m = r > n. By so doing it maximises
the intergenerational welfare of natives with a ”pay a as you go” pension scheme.
In order to reach this situation, the government will have to select the appropriate labour tax
rate b = bD that is enough to finance such a scheme under the golden rule m = r. Thus, making
use of the equation
pt+1
pt = 1
1 + rD = 1
1 + m   #   
and solving ( ref: kstar1 ) for the steady state level of kM
D , we obtain:kM




  #   
It follows that the steady state level of the real wage is:
gM




  #   
so that
gM
D = bD￿1 ? K￿￿1 + m￿
N + S￿1 ? N￿




  #   
Controlling the status of immigrants
through fiscal policy
The optimal level of income taxation
We have assumed that the government sets b = bD so as to maximise intergenerational
welfare, for a given rate of growth m of total immigration. However, the utility attained by
residents with migration, depends on the share of legal immigrants that decide to repatriate after
retirement, and on the share of immigrants that are illegal. In fact these shares determine the
capital stock and the wage rate of the economy. Thus, overall there are two fiscal instruments, S
and b, through which the government can try to maximise the level of utility of its nationals in
the presence of migration. From ( ref: utility ) and ( ref: c1budget ) we have:
UMt = JJ￿￿1 + rt+1￿￿1 ? J￿￿
1?J ￿1 ? b￿gt + pt+1
pt gt+1
Making use of ( ref: grule ), this becomes:
UMt = JJ￿￿1 + m￿￿1 ? J￿￿
1?J ￿1 ? bD￿gt + 1
1 + m gt+1
Substituting the steady state values of gM
D and gM
D from ( ref: omegam ) and ( ref: gm2 ) we get:
UM
D = AM 1 ? bD + bD
N + S￿1 ? N￿




  #   
where
AM ﬂ ￿1 ? K￿JJ￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 + m￿￿
1?J   #   
Since UM






1 + m ￿1 ? JW *￿ 6
6 1 ? bD + bD
N + S￿1 ? N￿





+ AM 1 ? 1
N + S￿1 ? N￿




from which we get:bD = K + ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿
￿1 ? JW *￿
? K
1 ? ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿
  #   
Note that, for given S < 1, the optimal rate of labour income taxation in ( ref: taustar ) is lower
the higher is the share N of immigrants that decide to remain in the host country after retirement,
and the higher is the ratio S. Moreover it is higher the larger is the share W * = 1 ? W # of
immigration which is illegal. While the last result appears intuitive, the first two may seem
puzzling. Further analysis is required.
The optimal level of transfer to non-resident
immigrants
Considering again equation ( ref: Um ), we can see that UM
D is a negative function of S. It
follows that, for given N and b, the value of S that maximises the nationals’ utility would be
S = 0. In other words, if the quota 1 ? N of legal immigrants that decide to retire in their home
country is exogenous, it is clear that the government of the host country, since it cares only about
its nationals’ utility (or rather, its permanent residents’ utility), should minimise the amount of
transfer paid to immigrants that retire in their country of origin. Such a policy, in the situation
described by our model, it would be tantamount to confiscating their pension credit.
The choice to retire in the home country
Assume, however, that the quota 1 ? N of legal immigrants that retire in their home country is
a positive function of the share S of the basic transfer, to which they are entitled if they return
home. In other words, let us assume that
N = f￿S￿ with fv < 0   #   
Let us also assume that the share of illegal immigrants is a decreasing function of b. In fact
illegal immigrants are supposed not to have other choice than going back to their country of
origin after retirement, obviously without any transfer from the host country government. As they
pay ”taxes” like legal immigrants —in the sense that they get the same net real wage—, but get
no transfer when retired in their home country, their incentive to be legal rather than illegal is
primarily a negative function of b, footnote  which for them corresponds to a pure loss of income.
Thus we assume:
W * = j￿b￿ with jv < 0   #   
From ( ref: Um ) we have:
UM
D = AM 1 ? bD + bD
N + S￿1 ? N￿




= FM 1 ? bD + bD
N + S￿1 ? N￿
￿1 ? J ? bD￿1 ? W *J￿￿
K







  #   
Substituting ( ref: deltaf ) and ( ref: muf ) we get:
UM
D = FM 1 ? bD + bD
f￿S￿ + S￿1 ? f￿S￿￿
￿1 ? J ? bD￿1 ? j￿bD￿J￿￿
K
1?K   #   
Let us specifically assume that:N = f￿S￿ = N0 + N1S with N1 < 0   #   
with
f￿1￿ = 0
f￿0￿ = _ † 1
  #   
In words, _ is the share of immigrants that remain in the host country after retirement, when the
host country government does not trasfer anything to them in case they were to return home.
Thus the complementary parameter 1 ? _ measures the immigrants’ desire to return home when
retired. footnote  Note also that in ( ref: ass2 ) we have assumed that, if immigrants were to
receive the whole of the basic transfer when they retire in the home country, then they will all
decide to return home.
Making use of both ( ref: deltass ) and ( ref: ass2 ), we have:
0 = N0 + N1
_ = N0 = ?N1
  #   
Thus f￿S￿ becomes:
f￿S￿ = _￿1 ? S￿   #   
The choice to immigrate illegally
Let us also assume that
W * = j￿b￿ = W * 0 + W * 1b with W * 1 < 0   #   
with
j￿1￿ = 0
j￿0￿ = V † 1
  #   
In other words, V is the maximum share of immigrants that enter the country illegally, and it
corresponds to the zero level of labour income taxation (b = 0). Conversely, when b = 1, all
immigrants enter the country legally, footnote  i.e. V = 0. Thus we have:
0 = W * 0 + W * 1
V = W * 0 = ?W * 1
  #   
so that the j￿b￿ function becomes:
j￿b￿ = V￿1 ? b￿   #   
Substituting, we get:
UM
D = FM 1 ? bD + bD
_￿1 ? S￿2 + S
￿1 ? J ? bD￿1 ? V￿1 ? bD￿J￿￿
K
1?K   #   
from which it can be seen that, in order to mazimise UM
D by controlling S, it is enough to
minimize _￿1 ? S￿2 + S with respect to S. Thus, the first order condition requires:/￿_￿1 ? S￿2 + S￿
/S
= ?2_￿1 ? SD￿ + 1 = 0
or
SD = 1 ? 1
2_   #   
Note that, since it cannot be negative, the optimum value of SD reduces to SD = 0 when _ † 1/2.
This means that, if more than half of guest workers decide to return home after retirement even
without getting any transfer, it is better for the goverment not to pay them anything, so as to





i.e., the lower the desire by immigrants to return home after retirement (as measured by 1 ? _),
the higher the share of pensions that the government will pay them in case they do retire in their
home country.
We can now solve for the optimal value bD in terms of the optimal values of N and
S. footnote  Considering that ( ref: deltass ) implies
ND = N0 + N1SD = _ ? _ 2_ ? 1
2_ = 1/2
and recalling that:
bD = K + ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿
￿1 ? JW *￿
? K
1 ? ￿N + S￿1 ? N￿￿
we substitute ( ref: mutilde ) and get
bD ? ￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿
￿1 ? JV￿1 ? bD￿￿
= K ? 2K
1 ? SD   #   
Substituting ( ref: tetastar ) we have an equation of second degree in bD:
JV￿bD￿
2 + ￿1 ? JV￿K￿1 ? 4_￿ + 1￿￿bD
? ￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿ + K￿1 ? 4_￿￿1 ? JV￿￿ = 0   #   
We would like to know how bD depends on the parameters J, K, V, and _. Before doing so,
however, we want first to check the form that the expression takes when all migration is legal,
i.e. when V = 0. In this case we have
bD = 1 ? J￿1 ? K￿ ? 4K_
so that the optimal tax rate bD is clearly decreasing in _. In other words, the lower the degree of
attachment to their country of origin on the part of immigrants, as measured by 1 ? _, the higher
the optimal rate of labour income taxation.
Returning to the case of both legal and illegal migration, unfortunately no closed form can be
meaningfully analysed for the roots of equation ( ref: tausquare ). We have therefore proceeded
to their numerical interpolation for different values of the parameters J, K, V, and _.
By so doing we can, in particular, obtain two results that are of interest from the point of
view of this paper. In fact we can see that bD, the optimal tax rate on labour income is (i)
increasing in V, and (ii) decreasing in _.
As for (i), the higher the maximum rate of immigrants that enter the country illegaly, asmeasured by V, the higher is the optimal rate of taxation of labour income. This first result is
intuitive: illegal immigrants do not contribute to financing the pension scheme, but neither they
draw on its resources. However, by increasing the host country’s labour force, they tend to
reduce the real wage, and therefore the taxation base for the pension scheme. It follows that a
higher rate of labour income taxation is required to finance the scheme.
As for (ii), the higher the share of legal immigrants that prefer to remain in the host country
after retirement, as measured by _, the lower the optimal rate of labour income taxation. This
may be puzzling, and is certainly not as intuitive as the first result. However, it follows from
legal immigrants being ”exploited” if they decide to repatriate, since in this case they are not
paid the full amount of the pension (S < 1). Thus residents (and also remaining immigrants) may
extract revenue from repatriating immigrants by raising the labour income tax. The higher the
share of repatriating immigrants, the higher the incentive to raise the income tax, whence the
result follows.
Conclusions and future extensions
We conclude that, while immigration is generally beneficial in the steady state with a ”pay as
you go” scheme of pensions, the optimal degree of transfer of pensions to immigrants that return
home depends negatively on the share of immigrants that strongly desire to return home after
retirement. footnote 
Moreover, the optimal degree of labour income taxation is increasing with the share of
immigrants that are ”home-sick” enough, after retirement.
Our model has also taken into account illegal migration. We have assumed that illegal
immigrants get the same net wage as legal immigrants, but, instead of paying taxation on their
labour income, they pay a fee to the criminal organisations that help their illegal immigration.
It has been shown that, beside influencing the share of legal immigrants that decide to remain
in the country after retirement, the government, by controlling the rate of labour income taxation,
can also optimise with respect to the share of immigrants that come illegally into the country.
In conclusion, two interesting results stand out: (i) the higher the maximum rate of
immigrants that enter the country illegaly, the higher is the optimal rate of taxation of labour
income; (ii) the higher the share of legal immigrants that prefer to remain in the host country
after retirement, the lower the optimal rate of labour income taxation.
Appendix
bD = ?￿1 ? K￿1 ? 4_￿JV ? JV￿
2JV
–
￿￿1 ? JV￿ ? K￿1 ? 4_￿JV￿










￿￿1 ? JV￿ ? K￿1 ? 4_￿JV￿
2 + 4JV￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿ + K￿1 ? 4_￿￿1 ? JV￿￿
1/2 +
? 1
2JV2 ￿￿1 ? JV￿ ? K￿1 ? 4_￿JV￿
2 + 4JV￿￿1 ? J￿￿1 ? K￿ + K￿1 ? 4_￿￿1 ? JV￿￿
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